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COMMENTS
MY TEACHER SUX! [CENSORED]:
PROTECTING STUDENTS’ RIGHT TO
FREE SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
KATHERINE HOKENSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a high school student who publishes an “underground”
magazine. She only puts out a couple issues, and sells and distributes
them primarily to her friends and acquaintances from school. Another
student writes, illustrates, and distributes her own comic strip, the subject of which is usually a school policy with which she disagrees. Students read these publications, discuss them amongst their social circles,
and, generally, they eventually wind up crumpled at the bottom of lockers until the last day of school. A few may still survive somewhere in
attics and basements along with a few stray, tattered biology notes and
other forgotten relics of high school.
Now imagine that instead of printing magazines and cartoons, and
distributing them at school, those same students go home, sit down at
their computer, and create websites and blogs containing similar material, also frequently depreciative of their school. Other students read the
website, maybe post comments, and, perhaps, also discuss it amongst
their social circles until, eventually, something more interesting comes
along to replace it.
The two scenarios are remarkably similar. Both involve student
publications of material which may or may not be considered socially acceptable. Both involve the school as a central subject. The primary pur* Katherine Hokenson is a J.D. Candidate, 2012, at The John Marshall Law School,
Chicago, Illinois. She is extremely thankful to her friends and family for their unwavering
support throughout the law school experience, especially her grandmother, Florence
Hokenson, and her fiancé, Brent Waldher. She also thanks the JCIL staff, past and present, for their support through the writing, editing, and publishing phases.
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pose of both types of publication is for the amusement of the student and
his or her friends, who are also the target audience.
The greatest difference between the two scenarios is the technology
used to facilitate publication. The Internet allows an unprecedented
combination of wide-ranging accessibility and simplicity of publication.
As a result, it is easier than ever before for students to both publish material and to reach a wide-ranging audience.
This advance in technology has resulted in a great disparity in the
treatment of student speech. In the first scenario it is unlikely that the
student would suffer any kind of punishment or censorship by the
school.1 The school may not appreciate being the subject of cartoon
mockery, but the student, in essence, is not doing anything “wrong.” In
the second scenario, if recent court decisions are at all indicative, the
student may well lose his or her First Amendment rights.2
The rise of the Internet and the subsequent ease and prevalence of
publication by anyone who can operate a keyboard and a mouse has
turned the traditional student First Amendment analysis on its head.
There is simply no reliable precedent to follow because the Supreme
Court has never ruled on student speech in the context of the Internet.
Consequently, courts are attempting to apply the decisions of the major
Supreme Court cases that have dealt with student First Amendment
rights to fit a medium which they are ill suited to address.3 Meanwhile,
other groups, such as schools4 and legislatures,5 are trying to find a solution independently of the courts.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed
students’ First Amendment rights in the context of the Internet, it is
1. Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). In the opening paragraph to the opinion, the judge noted, “It should have come as a shock to the parents of five
high school seniors in the Northeast Independent School District of San Antonio, Texas,
that their elected school board had assumed suzerainty over their children before and after
school, off school grounds, and with regard to their children’s rights of expressing their
thoughts. We trust that it will come as no shock whatsoever to the school board that their
assumption of authority is an unconstitutional usurpation of the First Amendment.” Id. at
964.
2. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002); Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F. Supp. 3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
These cases are discussed throughout this comment and all resulted in the curtailment of
the students’ right to free speech.
3. J.S., 807 A.2d at 847; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34; Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Doninger, 527 F. Supp. 3d at 41. These cases
are examples of the spectrum of approaches which the lower courts have used to reconcile
online speech issues with traditional Supreme Court precedent.
4. ACLU protests school district’s Internet policy; Policy allows for discipline of students who post libelous or threatening statements on Web from their homes, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Dec. 3, 2007, at B6.
5. Wendy N. Davis, No More Pencils, No More Facebooks, ABA J., July 2009, at 18.
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highly likely that it will do so at some point in the future. When that
time comes, it is essential that it do so in a matter that gives the maximum protection possible to freedom of speech. The Internet is too universal, and the First Amendment is too essential to support any other
approach.
Section I of this Comment provided an introduction to the problem of
student online speech. Section II will discuss the problem posed by student speech made on the Internet, how free speech issues are generally
addressed by courts, the Supreme Court cases that have specifically addressed the First Amendment rights of students, and factors that courts
dealing with student speech made on the Internet have attempted to use
in their decisions. Section III will look at how courts have analyzed online student speech cases in light of available Supreme Court precedent.
It will propose that the Court adopt a hybrid of the Tinker test when
addressing student speech made on the Internet, which will distinguish
between speech that has a physical connection to the school and all other
instances. The Comment will also consider some supplementary ways
that the First Amendment rights of students can be protected to avoid
unnecessary litigation. Section IV will conclude that a hybrid test combining the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District6 and strict scrutiny should be used
when analyzing speech made on the Internet by students.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will begin by discussing the ways that schools are trying
to deal with student speech on the Internet and the constitutional
problems that frequently result. Next, it will give a brief synopsis of
traditional free speech law. Following that, this section will discuss the
rulings that the Supreme Court has made concerning the free speech
rights of students. Finally, this section will give a brief synopsis of
courts’ attempts to analyze online student speech cases by highlighting
different factors courts have focused on and referring to a variety of recent case examples. The purpose of this section is to give the reader a
better understanding of the scope of this problem, its effect on the constitutional rights of students, the analytical support available for evaluating these types of cases, and suggest possible gaps within their
application.
6. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that
schools must show that the speech at issue threatened a substantial disruption to the
school environment or infringed on the rights of others). This case will be discussed at
greater length throughout this comment.
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A. THE PROBLEM
The problem is serious. Students regularly use the Internet to express themselves, but they do so at the peril of their constitutional
rights. Some schools are trying to bypass First Amendment scrutiny by
simply depriving students of their rights up front.7 In 2007, the Grand
Rapids, Michigan school district implemented a policy reserved to discipline students for posting libelous or threatening statements online from
their homes.8 However, Grand Rapids is not the only example.9 In 2007,
students in Arlington, Texas were required to sign a one-page contract at
the beginning of the school year stating that they would not send offensive digital pictures, download video footage, or send any instant
messages.10 Most of these policies were implemented with the intention
of curbing the phenomenon of cyber-bullying.11
Preventing cyber bullying is certainly a worthy goal. Anyone who
has experienced high school knows that students can be cruel, and the
Internet certainly creates a very public and easily accessible means of
harassment. However, forcing a student to sign away their First Amendment rights in a blanket contract is not a good solution. It opens the door
to abuse by school administrators by allowing them to censor student
speech, not because of any actual threat, but because it is critical of the
school.12 Within the school context, schools can punish students for their
behavior, but the fact remains that outside the schoolhouse gates, students enjoy full First Amendment rights.13 Any punishment for speech
made in this realm must be dealt with in a court of law, and students
who are subjected to online harassment outside of school are not without
resources and remedies.14
7. GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, supra note 4, at B6.
8. Id. It should be noted that the policy conditioned the use of school computers based
on consent to the restriction of students’ online activities outside of class. Id.
9. McClatchy-Tribune, As bullies go online, schools start cracking down, THE CAP.,
Dec. 24, 2007, at B5.
10. Id.
11. Id. Cyber-bullying is harassment conducted via the Internet. In perhaps the best
known example of cyber bullying, Lori Drew was indicted in 2008 for her role in creating a
fake MySpace account which she used to torment a thirteen year old girl who committed
suicide as a result. The case was ultimately dismissed. Mike Celizic, MySpace victim’s
mom disappointed by ruling, MSNBC (July 3, 2009), www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31722986.
12. Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers
and Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 213 (2009).
13. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
14. Calvert, supra note 12, at 225. The existence of outside remedies raises two issues.
First, it is quite likely that the experience of being sued for defamation may be a much
more effective, more longer-lasting lesson to a student than any punishment the school
might give. Id. at 225. Second, is it really fair for a student to essentially be punished twice,
once through the court system, and once through the school? Id. at 225.
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SOCIETY

The free speech clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law. . .abridging the freedom of speech.”15 The right to free speech is one of the most basic and
cherished rights of Americans. In Stanley v. Georgia, the United States
Supreme Court said, “If the First Amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch.”16 Although its
words may seem simple enough, over time the Supreme Court has established a complex fabric against which to interpret the limits of this basic
right.
Not all speech is protected under the First Amendment, however.
True threats,17 obscenity,18 and fighting words,19 for example, can all be
legitimately censored. If the speech does not fit into a category where
censorship is allowed, then courts must apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the speech can be censored. The result is that a very wide
range of offensive speech is protected.20
The Internet is proving to be the newest frontline for the battle over
free speech. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court declined to subject the
Internet to any specialized standards or exceptions and held that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.21 In Ashcroft v. ACLU,
the Supreme Court held that “community standards,” as defined in other
freedom of speech precedents, did not apply to the Internet.22
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
17. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1081 (John R. Vile et. al. eds., 2d vol.
2009) (The Supreme Court has not articulated a specific definition of what constitutes a
“true threat,” but its opinion in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) offered helpful insight. In that opinion, the Court held that, “True threats encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. . .with the intent
of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”).
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (holding that “obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.” The test for obscenity is “whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.”).
19. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that test for fighting words is
whether the speech advocates “imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.”).
20. JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL,
92-93 (3d ed. 2004).
21. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 878-79 (1997).
22. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002).
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SCHOOLS

Four quartet of Supreme Court cases govern the methods that courts
generally use to approach student freedom of speech cases: Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,23, Bethel School District
v. Fraser,24, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,25, and Morse v.
Frederick.26 Each case sets a new boundary on the limits of school administrators to restrict student speech.27 These holdings, as will be seen
throughout this comment, have become more difficult to apply as student
speech becomes much more widespread and accessible via the Internet.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The Tinker case emerged from of the turmoil of the controversy surrounding the Vietnam War. In Tinker, a small group of students planned
to wear black armbands to school in protest of the war in Vietnam.28
The school forbid the wearing of armbands in an attempt to prevent the
students from carrying out their protest.29 The students wore the armbands anyway, and the school suspended them.30 The Supreme Court
held in favor of the students, and, today, Tinker is considered to be the
watershed case regarding student free speech matters.31
According to the holding in Tinker, although students do not have
unlimited rights in the school environment, the school must justify its
decision to restrict their right of expression.32 There are two grounds
that the school may use to justify this restriction.33 The first justification is by showing that the expression material in question materially
23. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
24. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
25. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, (1988).
26. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
27. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393 (holding that schools may censor speech at a school or
school-sponsored even that may appear to promote illegal drug use); Hazelwood, 484 U.S.
at 260 (upholding censorship of school newspaper when the message is inconsistent with
the basic educational mission of the school); Bethel, 478 U.S. at 675 (holding that school
officials have the right to restrict student speech when it is sexually suggestive and offensive); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (establishing the threshold test for student speech in the
school environment).
28. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 506 (comparing the wearing of the arm bands to “pure speech,” which is
entitled to “comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”).
32. Id. at 513 (noting that if a regulation forbidding discussion of or expression of opposition to the Vietnam War, “it would be obvious that the regulation would violate the constitutional rights of students. . .if it could not be justified by a showing that the students’
activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school.”).
33. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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and substantially interferes with school discipline.34 The second justification is to show that the speech interferes with the rights of others.35
In its opinion in Tinker, the Supreme Court famously stated, “[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”36 Schools cannot arbitrarily restrict student speech simply because they do not agree with the view that is being expressed or because
they possess “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.”37
The Tinker case marked a high point for free speech in schools. Although the Court set certain guidelines in that case, overall, the decision’s tone was favorable and respectful towards student speech rights.38
The subsequent cases regarding student speech have not been nearly as
favorable, and those holdings justify concern for the future of student
speech rights39.
Bethel School District v. Fraser
The next case to deal with student free speech rights was Bethel
School District v. Fraser.40 The decision case almost two decades after
Tinker, and when it did, the Court proved that during those twenty years
it had become much more conservative regarding students’ free speech
rights.41 The Bethel case arose when a student delivered a speech full of
sexual innuendos at a school assembly, and the school responded by sus34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 506.
37. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. In this case, the Court held that the speech was passive
and unaccompanied by any disturbance on the part of the students. Id. at 508. In addition,
while there was some student reaction to the armbands, there was no indication of a disturbance sufficient to interfere with the ongoing educational process. Id. at 508.
38. Id. at 508. In its opinion, the Court noted that the slightest deviation from the
majority opinion may result in an argument or a disturbance. Id. This, however, is the
price of living in a democracy, and therefore a certain amount of risk and disturbance must
be tolerated. Id.
39. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 (holding that school was able to suspend student for
displaying instant messaging icon depicting the shooting of a teacher at the school); Doninger, 527 F.3d Supp. at 48 (affirming that school could punish student following blog post
criticizing school and urging readers to contact the school to protest the cancellation of a
concert the student had been involved in organizing); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A. 2d
at 852 (affirming right of school to punish student who posted a website containing derogatory material about his school principal and math teacher).
40. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675.
41. Compare the language in Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, which held that “undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance” is insufficient to justify a decision to censor (Id. at
508) and that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate” (Id. at 506) to that in Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675,
which held that the “constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. Id. at 682.
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pending the student.42 The student argued that the suspension violated
his right to due process because ”he had no way of knowing that the delivery of the speech in question would subject him to disciplinary sanctions,“43 but the Court rejected this argument, stating that ”two days’
suspension from school does not rise to the level of a penal sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process protections applicable
to a criminal prosecution,“ and at any rate, the rule contained in the
school handbook prohibiting ”obscene“ speech provided adequate warning to the student that his speech was unacceptable.44
In the Bethel decision, the Supreme Court narrowed its previous
holding in Tinker and held that school officials have the right to restrict
student speech when it is sexually suggestive and offensive.45 Students
have First Amendment rights, but those rights are not “automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”46 When a school
determines that allowing lewd or vulgar speech would “undermine the
school’s basic educational mission,” then it is appropriate for the school
to implement censorship sufficient to allow the school to disassociate itself from the speech at issue.47
The Supreme Court’s next decision further reformed Tinker.48 It
continued the Court’s trend of creating specific exceptions allowing for
censorship within the school environment, which began in Bethel.49 The
case concerned the rights of the student press.50 The school refused to
publish several student-written articles about divorce and teen pregnancy in the school newspaper.51 The Court held that “a school need not
42. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 677-78.
43. Id. at 686.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 682. The Court partially distinguished its decision in this case from Tinker
by noting that the decision of the school was unrelated to any political viewpoint.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 685. Allowing the school to censor speech which is sexually suggestive or
offensive prevents the undermining of “the school’s basic educational mission” and points
out to the rest of the student body that such speech is “inconsistent with the ‘fundamental
values’ of public school education.” Id. at 685.
48. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
49. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675.
50. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 262.
51. Id. at 264. Former high school students who had worked on the school paper filed
suit after the principal removed stories pertaining to teen pregnancy and divorce. Id. at
264. At this time, it was customary to present the paper to the principal for review before
publication. Id. at 263. Apparently this practice had been unproblematic up to this point.
Id. In this case, however, the principal was concerned that the identities of the girls mentioned in the teen pregnancy story had not been adequately obscured to avoid recognition,
and that the parents of one of the girls mentioned by name in the divorce story should have
been given the opportunity to respond. Id. In addition the principal felt that the subject
matter might be inappropriate for some of the students at the high school. Id.
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tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational
mission,’ even though the government could not censor similar speech
outside the school.”52 In its opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished
between speech simply made by students as a matter of course, and
speech which may give the appearance of having been sponsored by the
school.53 Furthermore, the Court mentioned the difference between supporting particular speech using the name and resources of the school versus punishing a student for creating and expressing their own speech.54
Morse v. Frederick
Morse v. Frederick is the most recent update limiting student speech
rights.55 At a school sponsored event, a student unfurled a large banner
with the message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” written on it.56 The school
principal saw the banner and told him to take it down, but the student
refused and was subsequently suspended.57 The Supreme Court created
yet another exception to Tinker and held that a school could restrict
speech that appears to encourage illegal drug use.58 At this point, it appears that the illegal drug use is a narrow category subject to restriction.
52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 267.
53. Id. at 271. Where the school would otherwise have no power to censor a student’s
speech, it does have that power when the speech is made in the context of school activities
which may be “characterized as part of the school curriculum.” Id. at 266. The Court again
differentiated from Tinker, saying that the speech at issue in this case did not merely happen to occur on school grounds, but that it occurred in direct connection with a school sponsored event. Id. at 271. Examples of these types of events include plays, publications, and
“other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Id.
54. Id. at 266. For example, plays and publications unconnected in any way with the
school would be acceptable forums for material, which might otherwise be inappropriate for
school. Id. at 272.
55. Morse, 551 U.S. 393.
56. Id. at 397. The school-sponsored event in question was the Olympic Torch Relay
through Juneau, Alaska in January 2002. Id. The relay was scheduled to pass by the student’s high school, and the principal decided to allow the students to attend as part of a
field trip. Id. Students were supervised by teachers throughout the viewing of the relay.
Id.
57. Id. at 398. The principal believed that the banner referred to and encouraged illegal drug use, which was a violation of school policy. Id. School policy was equally applicable both within the actual confines of the school and in the context of school sponsored
events such as the one in this situation. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the school had
violated the student’s First Amendment rights because there was no indication that the
speech created a risk of a substantial disruption as in Tinker. Id. at 399.
58. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. Instead of using Tinker the Court relied mostly on its prior
holding in Fraser, saying that students’ constitutional rights are not coextensive with the
rights of adults and also that Tinker is not absolute since Fraser did not rely on the “substantial disruption” analysis. Id. at 396, 405.
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To summarize the current state of the law, students have First
Amendment rights, but they are not absolute. Schools have general authority to censor speech which has the potential to create a substantial
disruption or interfere with the rights of others59 and can additionally
censor student speech in the case of certain specific situations.60 However, the recent development of cases involving student speech made on
the Internet has been problematic for courts constrained by these precedents.61 At some point in the future, it is highly likely that the Supreme
Court will face these challenges head on, and when it does, the Court
needs to turn from its increasingly conservative approach to student
speech and return to the more lenient standard in Tinker. Alternatively,
the Court should instead use traditional free speech analysis.
D. ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH
The Supreme Court precedents discussed above, which currently
govern the applicable rules of student speech, were made before the Internet became the new playground for students and the latest battlefront
in the student free speech war. The fact patterns at issue in those cases
concerned flesh and blood students performing tangible activities at
school. This, of course, is no longer the case, and courts across the country are struggling to develop and apply rules to conflicts arising from
online activity. Although courts have taken diverse approaches to analyzing these types of issues, there are several common factors that appear in case after case.
One such factor concerns geography. Geography concerns the physical location of things, such as the computer used, or where the material
was accessed.62 This concern has two prongs: first, where the speech
59. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
60. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675; Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551
U.S. 393. These exceptions refer to situations are when the speech is profane or obscene
such as a sexually explicit speech directed at a captive audience. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S.
at 685. When the speech may give the impression that it is supported by the school, such
as a play or a school newspaper. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271. When the speech
appears to advocate illegal drug use. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
61. Bethel Sch. Dist. 478 U.S. 675; Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551 U.S.
393. Tinker, the broadest of the cases, can be made applicable in some cases, as can Fraser
when the speech is of a particularly profane nature. The other two cases are more difficult
as online speech is unlikely to have been made under sponsorship of the school, and Morse
appears to apply solely to advocacy of drug use.
62. Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers
and Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 242 (2009). Geography can be a tricky term when it comes to
online speech, due to the fluid nature of computers. While the student may not have actually utilized the school’s computer to create the speech, they or someone else may have used
school property to access it. Perhaps it is merely the effects of the speech which have carried over into the school.
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was created, and second, where the speech was accessed. Was the student-creator on school property when the speech was published, or was
he or she at home or another private location? Was the speech viewed on
school property or only from private, off-campus locations? In J.S.63, a
student used his home computer to create a website called “Teacher
Sux,”64 which was devoted primarily to making derogatory comments
about his algebra teacher and the school principal. The court held that
there was a sufficient nexus between the website and the school to consider the speech to be “on campus.”65 Similarly, in J.C.66, the court
noted that the fact that the speech was created outside of school did not
preclude the school from disciplining the student.67 In Evans,68 however, the court held that the fact that a student’s speech was aimed at a
particular audience at the school was not enough to label the speech as
being on-campus, which was an important step in determining the status
of the speech for disciplinary potential.69
Courts also consider the issues of foreseeability and intent of the creator. Foreseeability focuses on how discernible it was that the material
at issue would reach the school grounds and create a substantial disruption.70 Intent refers to the desire, or lack thereof, on the part of the student that the material reach school grounds.71 In Wisniewski72, the
court held that speech that is “reasonably foreseeable” to come to the
attention of school administrators can be censored, in spite of the fact
that the speech at issue made no actual contact with the school.73 The
63. J.S., 807 A.2d at 847.
64. Id. at 850.
65. Id. at 865.
66. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
67. Id. at 1107-1108.
68. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
69. Id. at 1371.
70. Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers
and Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 238 (2009). The issue of foreseeability has played a large role in
the cases out of the Second Circuit. Id. There appears to be a bit of uncertainty as to
whether the court intends foreseeability to actually extend in some physical manifestation
on the school campus or whether it merely refers to reaching the attention of school administrators. Id.
71. Id. at 240. Intent has played a supporting role to the issue of foreseeability. Id. at
238. The intent of the student as to whether or not the speech comes to the attention of the
school community appears to at most be a relative, but not necessarily a determinative
factor. Id.
72. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).
73. Id. at 39. Apparently the student felt a great deal of animosity towards a particular
teacher, and he chose to express this dislike by making his Instant Message icon a handdrawn picture of the teacher getting his head blown off.
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Second Circuit confirmed its holding in the case of Doninger v. Niehoff,74
and other courts continue to follow in suit.75
Another concern is the identity of the person accessing the speech.
Was the person who accessed the speech the same person responsible for
creating the speech, or was it someone else entirely? In Layshock, the
Western District of Pennsylvania held that a school attempting to punish
a student who had used his grandmother’s computer to create a fake
MySpace profile of his school principal had failed to establish a “sufficient causal nexus between [the student’s] conduct and any substantial
disruption of school operations,”76 although students later accessed the
profile at school.77 The Third Circuit initially affirmed this decision, but
subsequently vacated and scheduled for a rehearing.78
Finally, courts have paid attention to the effects of the speech, particularly its potential to cause a substantial disruption in school. In J.S.,
74. Doninger, 527 F.3d Supp. at 48. The student, a class officer who was very involved
in her school, made an offensive post on her LiveJournal blog about the school administration’s handling of a music festival. The school did not suspend or expel the student, but
merely disqualified her from running for class secretary her senior year. In its opinion, the
court relied heavily on its previous decision in Wisniewski and held that a school can censor
online material, even when it is created off school grounds, if it was reasonably foreseeable
that the material would reach school grounds, and once there, that it would foreseeably
create a risk of substantial disruption. The court determined that it was reasonably foreseeable that the student’s blog would reach school grounds. Id. at 50. In order to support
this determination, the court pointed to the facts that the blog was public, that it was
written for the purpose of reaching the attention of members of the school community, and
the fact that it did in fact reach the attention of school administrators. Id.
75. See Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. 684 F.Supp. 2d 1114, *3 (E.D. Mo. 2010)
(holding that student who expressed desire via instant message on an off-campus computer
to shoot fellow classmates was sufficient to create a “reasonably foreseeable risk that would
come to the attention of school authorities” and that the student accordingly had the “requisite intent to communicate his threat. . ..”).
76. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601 (W.D. Pa. 2007). In its
opinion, the court said that the power of school authorities to restrict student speech is not
based on geography, and that any student conduct that “materially disrupts class work or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” is subject to restriction.
However, there must be a sufficient nexus between the school and the off-campus speech,
and the fact that the Internet can be accessed at school does not give schools the right to
censor it. Id. at 597. In addition, the disruption itself failed to rise to the level of “substantial.” Id. at 594.
77. Id. at 591. At the same time that the student’s profile was online, there also existed several other fake MySpace profiles of the principal. Id. It was actually through the
discovery of one of the other fake profiles, brought to the attention of the principal by a
third party, that the profile at issue in this particular case eventually came to be discovered. Id. However, the school determined that the acts of students accessing the website at
school created a disturbance which eventually led to the suspension of the student.
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
78. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9,
2010).
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although there was a complete lack of any actual criminal violation,79
the school pursued censorship, citing the impact of the website on the
school community.80 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the suggestion for donations to pay for a hit man did not
constitute a “true threat,”81 the court also considered the speech in the
context of the school setting,82 and determined that the website was sufficiently connected with the school to qualify as on-campus speech, thus
bringing the analysis back to the factor of geography.83 The court found
that the speech caused an actual and substantial disruption of the work
at school, and therefore the school’s restriction did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights.84
III. ANALYSIS
There are several reasons why courts should use a hybrid Tinker
test to analyze student speech made on the Internet. For one thing, a
79. J.S., 807 A. 2d at 852. When word of the website’s existence reached the attention
of school officials, the school principal at first believed that the part of the website requesting donations for a hit man was serious enough to constitute a threat. Id. An investigation
by both the local police authorities and the FBI resulted in no charges being filed against
the student. Id.
80. Id. After viewing the website, the algebra teacher became so upset that she was
unable to finish the school year and was granted a medical leave. Id. The principal claimed
that the effects of the website on the morale of the school community were “comparable to
the death of a student or staff member.” Id. In spite of this impact, the school continued to
allow the student to attend classes and participate in school activities, and they did not
refer him to any kind of psychological evaluation. Id. In fact, no disciplinary decision was
even made until the end of the school year, when the school notified the student’s parents
of the website and began suspension and expulsion proceedings. Id. By this point, the student had long since removed the website of his own volition. J.S., 807 A. 2d at 852.
81. J.S., 807 A.2d at 857. True threats are not protected speech in any setting. Id. at
856. The standard to determine whether a particular speech is a true threat is “whether a
reasonable person in the speaker’s position would be interpreted as a serious expression of
intent to harm or assault” in light of the factual context including surrounding events and
the reactions of listeners. Id. at 857. Both the court and police concluded that the website
did not pose a true threat. Id. at 852 n. 10, 859 n. 12.
82. Id. at 854. Speech, which may otherwise be protected, may be restricted in some
settings, including that of the school. Id. The court cited multiple precedents supporting
the assertion that the school presents a unique situation in which the obligation of the
school to provide an education takes precedence over certain instances of student speech.
J.S., 807 A.2d at 856.
83. Id. at 865. Although the website was created off-campus, at least some portions of
it were accessed on school grounds. Id. In addition, the court determined that the nature of
the website was such that it was aimed specifically at those connected with the school. Id.
These factors combined allowed the court to conclude that it was inevitable that the website would come to the attention of the school faculty and administration, in spite of the
disclaimer. Id.
84. Id. at 869. The court rejected the student’s argument that it was actually the
faculty which caused the disorder through its reaction after viewing the website. Id.
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broad, inclusive test avoids the expense of unnecessary litigation. The
Internet is not going anywhere, and students are not going to stop using
it to express their opinions. Since the majority of students’ lives are
spent either literally at or in some way connected to the school environment through extra-curricular activities and social connections, it should
come as no surprise that a great deal of student expression and opinions
are aimed in that direction. It is a waste of schools’ time and resources to
attempt to police every website that students may use to express themselves, especially when there exists a perfectly effective, taxpayerfunded, police force whose job it is to do such things.85
Most importantly, the hybrid Tinker test is the best way to prevent
censorship and to prevent violations of students’ constitutional rights.
Schools are the training grounds for the future leaders of this country.
Students will ingest the messages they receive now regarding the appropriateness of censorship, and they will carry them into adulthood. The
school’s limited, albeit important, role is confined to the area within the
schoolhouse gates,86 plus a small extension in the context of school sponsored events. Outside the physical gates of the school, students enjoy full
First Amendment rights.87 Inside, those rights are more limited, but
certainly existent. The Supreme Court has held that the rights of students in school are not “automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings.”88 The Court’s choice of words, however, implied that in other settings, the rights of students are indeed coextensive
with the rights of adults. Rather than viewing this fact as an all but
incapacitating limitation, schools should consider it an opportunity to
promote the growth of democracy by setting an example of tolerance.
Finally, stricter tests are unnecessary because individuals who feel
they have been injured by statements made by students on the Internet
have alternative resources to vindicate their rights. There is no need to
deprive students of their First Amendment Rights.
This section will consider some of the recent court decisions regarding student speech on the Internet and how the factors those courts have
looked at mostly fail to fit into the four Supreme Court cases which have
85. Nick Summers, Walking the Cyberbeat, NEWSWEEK (May 1, 2009), available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/195621. Police have become increasingly aware of the
goldmine of information that can be available on the Internet. Id. Police frequently investigate social networking sites for information on everything from underage drinking to murder. Id.
86. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. The Supreme Court stated that “it can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Id. at 506.
87. Id. at 506. In its opinion, the Court noted that students are “persons” under the
Constitution, and therefore have the same fundamental rights as any other citizen. Id. at
511.
88. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 682.
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addressed students’ First Amendment rights. It will conclude that the
nature of the Internet is too nebulous to fit into any of the bright line
tests without doing serious damage to the constitutional rights of students. Instead, this comment proposes that a hybrid test combining the
elements of Tinker and the traditional free speech analysis is an appropriate approach that will maintain discipline and order within the school
while also preserving the constitutional rights of students. It will conclude by discussing some alternatives that could potentially help preserve students’ right to free speech but are ultimately insufficient on
their own.
A. COURTS’ ANALYSES

OF

INTERNET SPEECH

In spite of the fact that none of the situations concerning the free
speech rights of students addressed by the Supreme Court involved the
Internet specifically, the holdings do provide the only available insight
into what the Court’s views are on the First Amendment rights of students.89 Consequently, when conflicts between students and schools
over online speech reach the point of litigation, courts have attempted to
fit the facts into these guidelines as best they can. By focusing on factors
such as geography, the identity of the person accessing the speech, the
target of the speech, and the effects of the speech, courts have tried to
follow the rules as best it can in an attempt to determine the extent of
student speech rights on the Internet.90 The results are mixed and unsatisfactory. It is apparent that previous tests are not actually conducive
to making these decisions and they do little to defend the First Amendment rights of the student or to provide a satisfactory solution for the
school in the end.
One of the biggest obstacles courts have faced in addressing
problems of student speech on the Internet is geography. The factor of
geography considers the location of the speech made in relation to the
physical property of the school.91 At first this may seem like a relatively
straightforward concept. Speech traditionally will either take place on
89. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.,
484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551 U.S. 393. The consensus of the Court at this point appears to be
that students have general First Amendment rights, so long as there is not a risk of a
substantial disruption or interference with the rights of others. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. Later
decisions have carved out context specific exceptions where the school can censor student
speech.
90. Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers
and Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 239-40 (2009). Courts have not, however, applied these factors
in any manner approaching consistency.
91. Calvert, supra note 12, at 242.
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school grounds or off-campus.92 When the issue of geography is applied
to online speech, however, it is much more difficult to make a concrete
distinction between on and off-campus speech. The closest that online
speech can get to being considered to have been made within the confines
of the school is if the student uses school property to create or view the
speech. The Southern District of Florida concluded that speech did not
qualify as “on-campus,” because, 1) the speech did not occur at a school
sponsored activity, and 2) the creator did not access the speech at school.
The Western District of Pennsylvania specifically declined to rely on geography even though the speech at issue had been accessed on school
computers.93 The court held that “the mere fact that the internet may be
accessed at school does not authorize school officials to become censors of
the world-wide-web.”94
Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood, and Frasier all focused on behavior that
occurred on campus, or that at least had a tangible, physical connection
with the school. A student expressing himself or herself, albeit offensively, on a website of his or her creation, on his or her own time, off of
school grounds, which may or may not be seen by fellow classmates is
vastly different from a student giving a vulgar speech to a captive audience of peers at a mandatory, school sanctioned assembly as was the case
in Bethel.95 Students are much more able to exercise choice and discretion when viewing a website than playing the role of the captive audience
when faced with in a live, mandatory school assembly.96 At least one
court has declined to apply Bethel in favor of Tinker when a student was
punished for viewing a website at school due to the lack of exposure to
other students.97 Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Bethel even acknowledged that the student’s speech would have been protected had it oc92. Morse, 551 U.S. 393.The United States Supreme Court appeared to blur this line a
bit in Morse when it held that school authority extended to school sponsored activities
While the student was not physically on school grounds, the Court held that because the
event at which he made the speech was sponsored by the school and supervised by school
administrators, that all school policies which would normally be applicable in the context of
physical school grounds were equally applicable. Id. at 401. In addition, the Court held that
the school had a special interest in deterring the promotion of illegal drug activity. Id. at
403.
93. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600-601 (W.D. Pa. 2007). In
its opinion, the court specifically noted that just as geography is not determinative for
when a school can censor speech, neither is it determinative for when a school cannot exercise censorship. Id. at 598. The opinion noted school sponsored events such as field trips,
sporting events, academic competitions, and the transportation to and from thereof as examples. Id. at 598.
94. Id. at 597.
95. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 677-78.
96. William Glen, Regulating Student Created Websites: Free Speech in Cyberspace 4,
CONNEXIONS, available at http://cnx.org/content/m14559/latest/.
97. Id. (discussing Coy v. Board of Ed., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Oh. 2002)).
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curred anywhere outside of the school context.98
Online behavior cannot even be construed to fall within Morse,99
which from a geographical perspective marked the furthest the United
States Supreme Court has ever gotten from the actual, physical confines
of the. When contemplating what qualifies as a “school sanctioned activity,” field trips, sporting events, and fundraisers all spring to mind. Time
spent surfing the Internet in the privacy of the home hardly qualifies as
a traditional “school sanctioned activity,” and it is hardly likely that the
United States Supreme Court envisioned it as such when they wrote
Morse.100 Any attempt by the school to force a student’s online speech
outside of the school boundaries to conform to these specific situations
constitutes a violation of the student’s First Amendment.
The issue of foreseeability is similar to geography. When evaluating
online speech, courts have considered whether it was foreseeable that
the speech would 1) reach the school and 2) cause a disruption.101 This
appears to be derived from the Tinker Test, which requires the threat of
a substantial disruption.102 The Second Circuit has relied heavily on this
factor.103 Tinker, however, was primarily concerned with the threat of a
disruption;104 it was presumed that the speech would already have
98. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393.
100. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. There is no mention that any of the cases discussed in this
comment advocated illegal drug use. However, even if they did or if another case should
arise which would purport to advocate such use, without the school sponsored context of
the situation, Morse would not be applicable.
101. Calvert, supra note 12, at 238
102. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
103. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit held that it was
foreseeable that the speech would come to the attention of school authorities. Id. at 35. A
difference between the two cases which gives pause for interpretation was the phrasing
which the court used in describing the factor of foreseeability. Calvert, Punishing Public
School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers and Classmates in Cyberspace: The
Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 238
(2009). Less than a year later, the court relied on its reasoning in that case to find that it
was also reasonably foreseeable that the speech presented in Doninger v. Niehoff would
reach campus. The court said that the fact that the student specifically directed her blog
post to members of the school community in general increased the likelihood to the point of
foreseeableness that the post would come to the attention of the school administration. Id.
at 50. It is notable that the eventual connection of the speech to the physical school was
considered foreseeable in spite of the fact that in both Wisniewski and Doninger, the speech
actually reached the school by the intervening actions of a third party. Although the Second Circuit decided both cases, the opinion in Wisniewski questioned whether it was foreseeable that the speech “would come to the attention of school authorities,” while the more
recent opinion in Doninger questioned whether it was foreseeable that the speech would
reach campus. Id. at 238. The Doninger opinion suggests more of a physical connection
with the school. See generally Doninger, 527 F.3d 41.
104. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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reached the school since the case exclusively concerned speech within the
schoolhouse. Similarly, Bethel, Hazelwood, and Fraser did not consider
this issue as the speech was already present in the school atmosphere.105
Hindsight is said to be 20/20, and, given the right circumstances, anything can be foreseeable. The blog entry in Doninger only came to the
attention of the school as the result of an Internet search conducted by a
school administrator’s adult son.106 Similarly, a simple Google search by
a curious teacher might be sufficient to bring some speech to the attention of the school. Considering the universal nature of the Internet, it is
hard to imagine anything that could not foreseeably reach the school.
The violation of students’ First Amendment rights cannot be built on
such an attenuated connection.
Courts have also paid close attention to the effects of the student
speech. Tinker held that schools can censor speech when it presents a
substantial threat of disruption or threatens to interfere with the rights
of others.107 In all of the cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court dealing with student speech, the speech, and its results, was fairly
easy to observe.108 It is much more difficult to make a connection between a website that may have been created miles away from campus
and subsequent on-campus incidents. A cursory overview of the “effects”
of student online speech is wide ranging and varied.109 Violation of students’ First Amendment rights cannot be justified on such geographical
disconnect and inconsistency.
105. See generally Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675; Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. 260;
See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393.
106. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46.
107. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
108. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (students wore black armbands protesting Vietnam War); Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675 (student gave lewd speech at school assembly
resulting in observable disturbance among the student body); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484
U.S. 260 (students prohibited from printing stories about divorce and teen pregnancy in the
school newspaper); See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (student displayed banner emblazoned with the phrase “Bong HiTs for Jesus” at school sponsored function).
109. See J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094. While the court agreed that school officials had the
authority to punish students for off-campus speech if the speech caused a substantial disruption, it did not agree that a general “buzz” among the student body resulting from a
YouTube video posted by a student was insufficient to meet this standard; Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (1998) (Principle upset by student’s
website was insufficient to create a substantial disruption under Tinker); Evans v. Bayer,
684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing that student’s Facebook page expressing dislike for a teacher could not be construed as disruptive); but see J.S., 807 A.2d
847; Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1123 (E.D. Mo 2010)(holding that student’s instant messages to another classmate saying he was going to kill other
certain classmates caused a substantial disruption for the school); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527
F. 3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming that student’s blog post requesting response from school
community created a risk of substantial disruption by encouraging others to contact the
school.)
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Closely related to the factors of foreseeability and actual effect, is
the intent of the student as to whether the speech in question should
actually reach the school.110 One factor that is unique to student speech
on the Internet is the identity of the person accessing the speech. Frequently, the speech at issue comes to the attention of the school as a
result of the actions of a third party, as in Wisnewski.111 As noted above,
the school only learned of the IM icon because another student brought
its existence to the attention of the school administration.112 Had the
third party not revealed the existence of the icon to the school, it is likely
that it would have remained a private joke within the students’ circle of
friends on his buddy list. The court113 did not seem particularly concerned about this detail, however, and it held that the school had the
power to punish the student for his IM icon, whether or not the student
intended it to reach the attention of school authorities.114 In J.S., the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld schools’ right to censor speech in
spite of the fact that the student displayed a very specific intent that the
material would not reach the attention of the school.115 Tinker, Bethel,
Hazelwood, and Fraser either did not address, or paid little attention to,
student intent.116 In Morse, the student claimed that the banner was
intended to be a nonsensical media prank.117 The United States Supreme Court, however, seemed only concerned about whether the speech
could possibly be perceived as promoting illegal drug use.118 In general,
the intent of the creator of the speech has not been given much weight by
any court, regardless of the context of the speech, online or otherwise.
110. Calvert, supra note 12, at 210.
111. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007).
112. Id. at 36. In addition to informing the administration of the existence of the icon,
the student also supplied a copy of the image.
113. Id. at 40.
114. Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers
and Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 239 (2009). In its opinion, the court held that the combination of
the foreseeability that the speech would reach the school, and once there, the foreseeability
that it would create a substantial disruption, combined to make the intention of the student as to whether the speech come into contact with the school irrelevant. Wisniewski v.
Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007).
115. J.S., 807 A.2d at 851. The student had designed the website so that in order for a
visitor to gain access, they were required to click on a disclaimer stating that by accessing
the website, the visitor agreed that they would not inform members of the school administration of the website’s existence or of the identity of its creator and additionally that they
were not members of the school administration. Id. at 851.
116. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Bethel, 478 U.S. 675; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551
U.S. 393.
117. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.
118. Id. at 401, 409. “The concern here is not that Frederick’s speech was offensive, but
that it was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.” Id. at 409.
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These factors are helpful in evaluating the characteristics of particular student speech, but they are not a solution without further dissemination. Because of the nearly universal accessibility of the Internet, they
are subject to a multiplicity of implications depending on the situation.
Of all the potential factors, geography holds the greatest potential for
usefulness, although it must be determined what exactly the definition
consists of and its subsequent. This concern will be discussed at greater
length in the following sections.
B. ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH UNDER

THE

TINKER TEST

When the United States Supreme Court eventually does address the
issue of online student speech, it should rule in a manner that upholds
the First Amendment rights of students. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District famously held that “students do not
shed their constitutional rights upon entering the schoolhouse gates,”119
even taking into consideration the special characteristics of the school
environment.120 The Court’s understanding was that minors were entitled to the full spectrum of constitutional rights, subject to minimal modification for purposes of the school environment.121 If students do not
abandon all of their rights to free speech when they enter the school, as
was held in Tinker,122 then it is highly unlikely that they leave even
more behind when they exit such as when they go home and hand-write
an entry in their journal or log on to the Internet and post a blog entry.
The Tinker test mandated two circumstances under which student
speech could be censored: 1) if the speech materially and substantially
interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, or 2) if it interferes with the rights of others.123 Its
broadness makes it the most applicable test to speech that students
make on the Internet because it can be applied generally to a wide range
of situation.124
119. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
120. Id. The Court explicitly admonished that a totalitarian atmosphere was not to be
among one of the special characteristics of the school environment. Id. at 511. Schools were
not to limit the expressions permitted to only those meeting with official approval. Id. at
511.
121. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1026, 1038 (2008).
122. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
123. Id. at 513.
124. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1026, 1065 (2008). Tinker did little to clarify what qualified as a substantial disruption,
and courts have been trying to determine that ever since. Id. The attenuated connections
presented by online speech amplify this already present difficulty. Id. The court must determine whether to consider the substantial disruption in the context of its actual effect on
students or based on any effects on the administration. Id.
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Since the decision in Tinker,125 the Court has persistently regressed
in its view of students’ First Amendment rights. Every subsequent decision to Tinker has set up new obstacles. With the increasing role played
by the Internet in society, these restrictions have the potential to unnecessarily restrict student speech in areas outside of the school environment - areas where schools should not have any authority to dictate
students’ speech. They are also extremely difficult to apply in an online
context. Outside of the school environment, students enjoy the full First
Amendment rights of citizens. The complex and unpredictable nature of
the Internet means that it has the ability to create unending variations
for student speech. Within the school context, the basic Tinker test is the
simplest to apply, and it is the most favorable to student speech.
This comment proposes that courts apply the traditional Tinker test
when the speech can be shown to have a demonstrable geographic connection to the school. A demonstrable geographic connection can be established by showing that 1) the speech was created on or using school
property, and/or 2) the speech was accessed in some form on school.
Of course, Tinker is not without its drawbacks. Over the years,
courts have especially struggled to define what constitutes a substantial
disruption.126 Online cases can be especially difficult due to the attenuated nature of the speech’s connection to the school. Establishing a solid
geographic relationship as described above should help to reduce this
concern.
Online cases can be especially difficult due to the attenuated nature
of the speech’s connection to the school. Establishing a solid geographic
relationship as described above should help to reduce this concern.
Additionally, there are several other considerations courts should
keep in mind when applying Tinker to online student speech. One such
consideration is whether the individual who is ultimately held responsible for creating the disruption should be the creator of the material or
125. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
126. See J.S., 807 A.2d at 869 (finding that because the website was likely to be accessed by students and teachers, in addition to the personal disturbance of the algebra
teacher, sufficient cause for a substantial disruption existed.); see also Doninger v. Niehoff,
527 F.Supp. 3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008). The question is not “whether there has been actual
disruption, but whether school officials ‘might reasonably portend disruption’ from the student expression at issue.” Id. at 51. But see Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (rejecting school’s argument that an email from a student about a teacher containing offensive comments interfered with the school’s ability to
effectively discipline its students). The student had sent the email to a number of friends,
intending it to be a joke, albeit an immature one. Id. At some point a copy of the email
appeared on campus, but the student denied that he was responsible for bringing it onto
school grounds. Id. at 449. In its decision the court said, “We cannot accept, without more,
that the childish and boorish antics of a minor could impair the administrators’ abilities to
discipline students and maintain control.” Id.
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the student who brought it to the administration’s attention in the first
place? Who is most directly responsible for causing the substantial disruption? If a student posts something on the Internet that is then later
accessed by third parties, through no fault of the creator, who should
bear the blame? These are all questions that must be resolved on a caseby-case basis, but courts should make an effort in light of the intent of
the students involved and in a manner that infringes as little as possible
on students’ First Amendment rights.
The school should also take a good look at the context of the speech
before leaping to conclusions and actions that could have litigious consequences down the road. Students talk to each other. A website making
fun of a known teacher is almost guaranteed to gain some notoriety. A
student may “tattle” to a school administrator regarding the existence of
a website.127 Teachers and administrators may well stumble across the
content themselves as a result of a curious Google search.128 The transition from interesting news topic of the day being discussed in the lunchroom or around the water cooler to full-out disruption is a matter of
degree. Considering these factors, it makes sense that the person directly
responsible for causing the actual disruption should be the party held
responsible for the consequences of their actions.
This inherent weakness of the Tinker test is why it should be used
with some caution. In other words, Tinker should only be applied in
cases where the speech in question finds its way into the school in a
physical capacity. Otherwise, it would be too easy for schools to search
the Internet or monitor students’ online social activities and then hide
behind Tinker in an attempt to justify censorship.
C. MAINSTREAM SPEECH
When the online speech cannot be found to have made any tangible,
physical connection within the schoolhouse gates, schools must surrender their authority over the student and the speech. This does not mean
that the speech is not subject to any restrictions. Rather, it simply means
that the speech will be subject to the same rules as speech made by any
citizen.
Unless the speech at issue falls into one of the unprotected categories, then it is subject to at least minimal protection.129 Speech made on
127. Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers
and Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 235, 236 (2009).
128. Calvert, supra note 12, at 235.
129. Political speech is given the highest available protection in the form of strict scrutiny. Protection of Core Political Speech, US LEGAL, http://civilrights.uslegal.com/freedomof-speech-and-expression/protection-of-core-political-speech/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
However, protection is also granted in other cases. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874. “. . .[S]exual
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the Internet is no exception to this rule. In Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, the Supreme Court held that the application of “community standards” alone was not necessarily inapplicable to the Internet.130
However, the Court did not take a position as to whether national or
local community standards would apply when using the Miller test to
evaluate the pruriency and patent offensiveness prongs.131 As has been
discussed at length in this paper, courts are showing a tendency to rely
heavily on geography as a factor for analyzing student speech made on
the Internet. When it comes to the issue of student speech, if the school is
unable to establish a geographic connection between the physical space
inside the schoolhouse gates and the speech, then the speech is no different than any other appearing on the Internet. Therefore, since the student is making the speech in the capacity of a normal citizen, it should
not be treated any differently.
D. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
This comment does not mean to imply that individuals who are
made the target of juvenile and cruel speech should simply suffer in silence. Rather the intention is to provide clarity for courts struggling to
analyze student speech made on the Internet in a manner that preserves
the maximum amount of protection for freedom of speech. Not only is
this approach in the best interest of democracy, it is further supported by
the fact that there are a variety of alternative ways by which schools’ and
individuals’ interests can be protected without infringing students’ constitutional rights.
Individuals who are made the targets of online speech already have
pre-existing remedies within the court system. If student speech outside
the context of the school environment is treated like any other form of
speech under the Constitution it follows that it is also subject to the
same kinds of restrictions regarding unprotected speech. Thus speech
constituting fighting words, obscenity, or true threats is not protected.132
In the case where a student’s speech has truly “crossed the line,” victims
have traditional remedies such as defamation or intentional infliction of
emotional distress.133 It is simply unnecessary to impose on students’
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at
874, quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (U.S. 1989).
130. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 585. The case concerned the constitutionality of the Child
Online Protection Act’s provision of using “community standards” to identify content that is
harmful to minors. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 20, at 107.
131. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 20, at 107.
132. David L. Hudson Jr., True Threats Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/personal/topic.aspx?topic=true_threats.
133. In addition to the traditional civil cause of action for defamation, many states have
also established criminal defamation laws. ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., LIBEL
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First Amendment rights when the law already provides perfectly acceptable remedies.
Schools generally have some control over speech that occurs within
the schoolhouse gates, and thus they also have the ability to protect
themselves without infringing on students’ First Amendment rights. By
establishing clear, comprehensive policies for Internet communication, it
may be possible in many cases to prevent conflicts before they ever
arise.134 For example, a school may establish a policy prohibiting students from viewing any personal websites in the classroom. This scheme
could potentially avoid the problem of schools handpicking websites to
censor. It would also provide a bright-line rule for students so that there
is no question as to what may or may not be acceptable. Problems are, of
course, still a possibility with such a rule.135 However, such a policy still
has the advantage of reducing confusion as to what is permissible and
can help to prevent unnecessary lawsuits, which can threaten students’
First Amendment rights.
Finally, protection of students’ First Amendment rights can also be
facilitated through legislation. States have been known to react to decisions restricting students’ speech rights by implementing protection for
those rights through the legislative process.136 For example, in the wake
of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, a number of states passed legislation extending First Amendment protection to student presses.137 California
has provided students with the same First Amendment Rights in school
as they enjoy out of school by limiting schools’ jurisdiction over students.138 Schools may not suspend students for behavior that has not
been provided for by statute, and the behavior must be “related to school
activity or school attendance occurring within a school under the jurisdiction of the superintendent of the school district or principal or occurINSULT LAWS: A MATRIX ON WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE
171, available at http://www.osce.org/fom/41958.
134. William Glenn, Regulating Student Created Websites: Free Speech in Cyberspace 8,
CONNEXIONS, available at http://cnx.org/content/m14559/latest/.
135. In order for such a policy to be feasible, it is imperative that it be drafted clearly
and enforced consistently. Id. at 8. Courts may perceive lack of clarity or inconsistent
enforcement as censorship. Id.
136. Student Press Law Center, States propose student press protections, 18 HIGH SCH.
2,10 (1997) available at www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=107&edition=14.
137. Id.
138. Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union to Rick Messer, Principal, Mesa Verde High
School (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/47754789/2010-12-30-Letter-to-Mesa-Verde-High-School-re-Donny-Tobolski-2. The California Education Code states
that schools may not discipline students for speech that, “when engaged in outside of the
campus, is protected from governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of the California Constitution.” CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48950(a) (2011).
AND
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ring within any other school district.”139 State senator Gary LeBeau of
Connecticut was so appalled by the court’s decision in Doninger140 that
he introduced legislation that prohibited schools from disciplining students for online posts unless the remarks threatened others.141 Regarding the difference between speech made on the Internet and other more
traditional speech, in February 2009, he was quoted as saying, “This is
like saying you can’t write on a piece of paper and distribute that piece of
paper outside the school.”142
Legislative solutions are one way to strengthen protection for students’ First Amendment rights. However, they are no substitute for
strong case law, particularly from the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court merely establishes a minimum standard, which the states must
abide by; legislatures are always free to grant additional protection. The
stronger the minimum protection established by the Supreme Court, the
higher the threshold states must begin at if they wish to add additional
protection, and the higher the minimum level that must be retained if
they do not.
IV. CONCLUSION
Years ago, the students discussed in the Introduction to this comment might have employed a number of print alternatives to express his
or her feelings towards the school. They may have simply drawn a picture or, if feeling ambitious, perhaps created a magazine-type publication. Instead, today they are much more likely to express themselves on
the Internet.
139. Id.
140. Doninger, 527 F. Supp. 3d 41.
141. Davis, supra note 5, at 18. Senator LeBeau proposed “An Act Concerning Students’
Right to Free Speech.” S. 1056, (Conn. 2009). The bill prohibited schools from punishing
students or censoring their speech, regardless of whether the speech was school sponsored.
Id. The proposed bill also contained a general amendment to prohibit school authorities
“from punishing students for the content of electronic correspondence transmitted outside
of school facilities or with school equipment, provided such content is not a threat to students, personnel or the school.” S. 478, (Conn. 2009). Exceptions were made for speech that
was likely to cause a material and substantial disruption; however mere inconvenience to
school officials or employees was not included in this classification. S. 1056, (Conn. 2009).
Speech that is lewd, vulgar, or indecent was also excepted if it occurs on school grounds
during school hours or during a school-sponsored activity. Id. Exceptions were also made
for speech that is intended to be harassing and speech that materially and substantially
invades privacy. Id. With so many exceptions there is little left of the actual bill. As a
result, there is little actual protection remaining for students’ First Amendment rights, and
thus, while Senator LeBeau’s heart is certainly in the right place, the state legislature
ultimately proves to be an inadequate route to resolving this problem.
142. Arielle Levin Becker, Web Speech: When May Schools Act?; Lawmakers Consider
Bill to Clarify Students’ Rights; Internet Dispute, HARTFORD COURANT, February 1, 2009, at
A1.
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When the Supreme Court eventually faces the issue of online student speech, it should first ask whether the speech bears a tangible geographic connection to the school. If the speech is found to have been
created on or using school property and/or accessed in some form on
school property, then the court should proceed to apply the Tinker Test
and consider whether the speech either created a material and substantial disruption to the school environment or infringed on the rights of
others. If the speech is not found to have a tangible geographic connection to the school, then the court should proceed to analyze the speech as
it would any other speech created by any other citizen.
“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s
Future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”143
The person who is an exasperating high school student today may be the
head of a company or a government leader one day. The attitudes they
have formed about such issues will influence how they make important
decisions. Once embarked on, censorship can be a very slippery slope,
and students are indeed impressionable. Schools should pause and consider the potential long term consequences of any decision to censor
speech or its creator before acting. Additionally, individuals, schools,
and legislatures should consider ways in which to vindicate the rights of
all citizens while providing the maximum possible protection for students’ First Amendment rights.
143. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.

